The Pivot of Trade to Asia-Pacific

President Trump's withdrawal of the United States' signature from the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) has not only left a great void, but has thrown its partners into disarray, both in Asia and the Americas. The partnership agreement had three merits: 1) it bridged the Pacific between the Americas and Asia; 2) it reaffirmed and renewed, commercially, the presence of the United States in the Asia-Pacific; and 3) it enacted commercial rules with a view to transnational interconnection. The TPP was not entirely lost since, following a joint initiative by Japan and Canada, the agreement was slightly revised to become the Comprehensive and Progressive Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP) agreement. Its scope and interest nevertheless remain limited. Since then, the United States has concluded a new trade agreement with its two neighbors, CUSMA (Canada – United States – Mexico Agreement) and put in place, since the arrival of Joe Biden as president, new frameworks for discussion and negotiation with the EU and Asia but also Africa. The new American initiatives towards Asia nevertheless stand out from the previous ones (APEC / TPP) to the extent that (1) they cover the Indo-Pacific rather than the Asia-Pacific, (2) they go beyond the classic framework of free trade agreements, and (3) they are reactive, in relation to the RCEP and the new Silk Roads. The new strategy, called Indo-Pacific, was launched in February 2022 and negotiations began in September 2022. For its part, Canada also adopted a strategy for the Indo-Pacific and officially requested to participate in the negotiations led by the United States. My communication will have three objectives: Present the Canadian and American strategies for the Indo-Pacific; Draw up a statistical portrait of economic and trade relations between the United States, Canada and the countries of the region, particularly those engaged in the negotiations; and In the current state of negotiations, initiate a debate on possible scenarios.

Japan and the EU concluded the Economic Partnership Agreement (EPA), which entered into force on February 1, 2019. Chapter 16 of the EPA covers trade and sustainable development. Environmental issues, including climate change, have been defined in several EPA articles. At the 2021 summit, Japan and the EU agreed on the Green Alliance, which is a plan to promote global cooperation on decarbonization. Green Marine encourages Japan and the EU to work together to support developing countries and technological innovations. The joint declaration of the May 2022 EU-Japan summit declared that Japan and the European Union would implement the Green Alliance and reaffirmed the strategic value of their cooperation under this project. In this presentation, I would like to discuss the environmental impact of the EPA in Japan and show how environmental laws and issues, including ESG investing and animal welfare, have evolved in Japan.

The efficiency of economic policies requires predictability of investment and trade operations for which a well-structured legal system, equipped with effective dispute resolution mechanisms, is a major asset. This observation applies as much to the protection of foreign investments as to commercial relations, the stakes of which are often considerable, whether they are large-scale one-off operations, or “mass” contractual relations. Internal dispute resolution mechanisms National policies relating to investment operations or commercial relations therefore occupy a particular place in the economic policies of a country or a regional organization seeking to build a free trade area. It is therefore hardly surprising that the economic development of the East Asian region (defined here as “ASEAN plus three”) is also accompanied by the creation of international dispute resolution bodies. dedicated national networks (especially China Inte National Commercial Court (CICC) and the Singapore Inte National Commercial Court (SICC)), as well as the influence of East Asian countries on international rule-making processes. national laws is becoming more and more perceptible (as illustrated by recent developments within the Hague Conference on International Law). private national). Mechanisms for resolving international economic disputes national, in the context of the pivot of trade towards the Asia-Pacific is therefore an area which requires more in-depth study, in order to assess how the economic influence of this area translates into an adaptation of the legal rules inherited from a time when what can be perceived as a European and Anglo-Saxon influence predominated. The attractiveness of East Asian States is in fact such that international legal instruments and tools National laws must evolve to be compatible with Asian legal systems. Other economic powers must also adapt, and we will analyze how they, and in particular the European Union, can change their rules to maintain and support economic relations with East Asia. Asian attractiveness is clearly perceptible with regard to the mechanisms for settling international economic disputes. national standards, and we propose to explore the main issues and confirmations, while drawing the consequences on the understanding of the international legal framework. ation for commercial and foreign investment operations.

In many States, the Covid 19 crisis has brought the question of pharmaceutical sovereignty to the forefront. Shortages of medical equipment and medicines and the question of vaccine availability have fueled numerous debates. The causes identified are multiple, starting with the profound changes in the health industries over these thirty erst years which resulted in a concentration of laboratories and a fragmentation of the industry. Numerous relocations have taken place (80% of the active substances in medicines marketed in Europe are no longer manufactured there but come from Asia), exposing a large number of States to the risk of supply chain disruptions, another product of globalization. The response to this situation consists, particularly in Europe and France, of proposing a proactive policy focused on the relocation of a certain number of pharmaceutical companies. Beyond the economic relevance of this policy, its legal compatibility with international commitments national policies of the States subscribed to in the investment agreements questions. The globalization of the economy and the relocation of industries, not just pharmaceuticals, have in fact relied on the network of international treaties. national investment standards. These of iers promote free competition at the global level by ensuring international mobility nationality of production factors (and therefore their location in the most economically attractive places which are often located in Asia) and their protection against state measures likely to harm them. Today, the question therefore arises as to whether the obligations set out by these treaties would not oppose the relocation policies announced. The question is of importance at the global level, but even more so in the Asia-Pacific region which has attracted many pharmaceutical companies and which can now fear a swing of the pendulum. It is then first envisaged to study whether the relocation policies of the pharmaceutical industry - understood as public health policies - are the subject of particular attention in investment agreements in the Asia-Pacific zone as well as in agreements of the same type concluded between these States and the European Union. It is then proposed to see if the material obligations contained in these agreements could be used by the States of the Asia-Pacific zone both to oppose the departure of pharmaceutical factories established on their soil and to strengthen their own sovereignty in this area.

En 1986, la réforme économique Doi Moi, signifiant renouveau, a été initiée par le Parti communiste vietnamien. À partir de cette date, l'économie de marché a été autorisée, voire encouragée. Depuis lors, le Vietnam est passé d'une économie planifiée rigide et axée sur l’agriculture à une économie d’industrie et de service basée sur le marché. En 2023, cet État a une population jeune, un système politique stable, un engagement en faveur d'une croissance durable (environ 8% en 2022), une inflation relativement faible (3,15% en 2022) [1] et une monnaie stable. La réforme lancée il y a plus de trente ans a stimulé la croissance et le développement économique du Vietnam, transformant ainsi l'un des pays les plus pauvres du monde en un pays à revenu intermédiaire (4.162 USD [2] ).  Le Vietnam est aussi l’une des économies d'Asie les plus ouvertes au commerce inte ational. Il a signé nombre d’accords d’investissements et d’accord de libre échange de nouvelle génération, ce qui lui a permis d’augmenter rapidement le volume des échanges commerciaux inte ationaux [3] . Parallèlement à la croissance des échanges commerciaux inte ationaux, l’on constate une augmentation fulgurante des litiges, ce qui conduit à la surcharge des tribunaux étatiques. Or, très peu d’opérateurs économiques vietnamiens optent pour l’arbitrage. Une étude réalisée en 2022 par le professeur Van Dai DO fait savoir que les entreprises vietnamiennes sont réticentes à recourir à l’arbitrage ; et si celles-optent néanmoins pour ce mode de règlement des conflits, elles choisissent de recourir à l’arbitrage étranger, notamment à Singapour et à Hong Kong. Cette réticence n’est pas souhaitable pour le Vietnam [4] ; surtout au vu de la Décision n o 1268/QĐ-TTg en date du 2 octobre 2019 du Gouve ement vietnamien, portant approbation du Projet de mode isation du droit du contrat et du règlement des litiges contractuels par voie arbitrale et de conciliation, qui ordonne à ses organes de bien étudier cette branche juridique afin de rendre l’arbitrage vietnamien plus attractif. Une des raisons qui explique ce manque d’attractivité de l’arbitrage est l’ambiguïté de la législation vietnamienne relative à l’arbitrabilité et son interprétation souvent trop sévère par le juge étatique. En effet, l’article 2 de la Loi sur l’arbitrage commercial utilise la méthode positive en listant des litiges “ouvrables” à l’arbitrage. Or, cette liste à la fois rigide et vague (lorsqu’elle renvoie aux textes spéciaux), pose bien des difficultés dans la pratique, ce qui constitue une insécurité juridique et décourage les opérateurs économiques [5] . Une réforme du droit de l’arbitrage s’impose de fait. Deux grandes questions se posent alors. La première est de savoir dans quels cas l’Etat, qui a lui-même permis la naissance et le développement de l’arbitrage, voudra le limiter, et pour quelles raisons. La seconde est de savoir si l’attribution d’une compétence étatique exclusive constitue un critère d’inarbitrabilité. C’est une question digne d’être posée car elle a suscité des difficultés notables dans la pratique. Par arbitrabilité, l’on distingue arbitrabilité subjective et arbitrabilité objective. L’arbitrabilité subjective se pose lorsque l’arbitrage est contestée à l’égard de l’une des parties, en raison de sa qualité ou d’une mission particulière qui lui interdirait de se soumettre valablement à la justice arbitrale. Cette limite conce e essentiellement l’Etat et les organismes publics. L’arbitrabilité objective, quant à elle, conce e l’aptitude d’un litige à faire l’objet d’un arbitrage. Si le débat sur l’arbitrabilité subjective est pratiquement dépassé dès lors que la solution est apportée par des règles matérielles tant en France qu’au Vietnam, il n’en va pas de même pour l’arbitrabilité objective qui, dans de nombreux pays, suscite des débats importants. C’est donc elle seul qui nous intéresse dans le cadre de cette étude. Nous tentons d’y apporter des réponses en comparant le droit vietnamien avec le droit français et le droit singapourien. Si nous choisissons le droit français et le droit singapourien, c’est parce que ces deux pays ont opté pour un libéralisme arbitral et que l’arbitrage y est très développé, ce qui nous permettra de dégager des solutions pour le Vietnam. Notre étude sera sans doute intéressante pour les praticiens dans la mesure où elle leur fou ira des pistes de solutions quand ils auront à répondre à la question d’arbitrabilité eu égard au droit vietnamien, français ou singapourien. La problématique et la méthode ainsi présentées, nous déclinons nos axes de réflexions de la manière suivante: Plan (provisoire) Introduction (questions préliminaires: principe compétence-compétence; loi applicable à l’arbitrabilité [6] ). Les critères généraux d’arbitrabilité 2.1. Méthode positive (Vietnam) La loi liste expressément des litiges ouvrables à l’arbitrage. Cette liste est-elle trop fermée? Qu’en sera-t-il des litiges ne figurant pas sur la liste? Faut-il élargir cette liste afin de rendre plus attractif l’arbitrage comme l’ont fait les systèmes favor arbitrandum?….. 2.2. Méthode négative (France)  Les articles 2059 à 2061 du code civil: indisponibilité des droits; violation de l’ordre public 2.2. Méthode mixte (Singapour) Article 11.1 de la loi sur l’arbitrage inte ational dispose que « tout différend que les parties ont convenu de soumettre à l'arbitrage en vertu d'une convention d'arbitrage peut être tranché par arbitrage à moins qu'il ne soit contraire à l'ordre public de le faire. » En 2019, la loi sur l’arbitrage inte ational a été révisée afin d’inclure expressément la possibilité pour les différends afférents à la propriété intellectuelle puissent également être résolus par voie arbitrale (Parties 2A, Article 26B). L’inarbitrabilité en faveur de la compétence d’un juge étatique? Question récurrente dans les trois pays à savoir si les litiges portant sur un bien immobilier sont-ils arbitrables ?   [1]           https://vneconomy.vn/tang-truong-gdp-ket-qua-2022-ky-vong    2023.htm#:~:text=(3)%20%C4%90%E1%BA%B7c%20bi%E1%BB%87t%20n%C4%83m%202022,v%E1 %BB%A5%20t%C4%83ng%209%2C99%25. [2]          Selon les estimations du FMI. https://kinhtetrunguong.vn/kinh-te/kinh-tet-vi-mo/gdp-binh-quan-viet-nam-nam-     2000-xep-thu-173-200-the-gioi-nam-2022-thay-doi-the-nao-   .html#:~:text=Ngu%E1%BB%93n%3A%20IMF.,th%E1%BB%A9%20117%20tr%C3%AAn%20th%E1%BA              %BF%20gi%E1%BB%9Bi%20. [3]          Le volume des échanges commerciaux représe 185% de son DIP en 2022.             https://mof.gov.vn/webcenter/portal/vclvcstc/pages_r/l/chi-tiet-tin?dDocName=MOFUCM242367 [4]          Đỗ Văn Đại, Phương thức giải quyết tranh chấp bằng trọng tài trong bối cảnh hội nhập kinh tế quốc tế , Nxb        Hồng Đức, tr. 15-16. [5]              V. par ex. Ngô Quốc Chiến và Nguyễn Hoàng Anh, “Trọng tài thương mại quốc tế và vấn đề luật áp dụng”,      Tạp chí Nghiên cứu Lập pháp, số 1 (425) tháng 1/2021, tr. 21-29; Đỗ Văn Đại (chủ biên), Giao dịch dân sự     về bất động sản , Nxb Hồng Đức, Chương 38. [6] Singapour : arrêt Anupam Mittal v Westbridge Ventures II Investment Holdings [2023] SGCA 1 dans lequel la Cour d’Appel de Singapour confirme qu’à Singapour, la loi gouve ant la convention d’arbitrage et la loi du siège sont pertinents pour la détermination de l’arbitrabilité d’un différend

Entré en vigueur le 30 décembre 2018 après une décennie de négociations et de bouleversements, l’Accord de Partenariat transpacifique global et progressiste (PTPGP) se démarque non seulement par sa dimension commerciale mais aussi par la diversité des questions non commerciales traitées, faisant de lui un des plus ambitieux accords commerciaux régionaux (ACR) de nouvelle génération. En effet, différemment aux accords commerciaux traditionnels, le CPTPP incorpore dans son champs un grand nombre de questions non commerciales liées aux enjeux globaux. En particulier, son chapitre 20 contient des dispositions avancées sur la protection de l’environnement, imposant des obligations strictes et des mécanismes de mise en œuvre effectifs. L’éventail des questions environnementales régies par le chapitre est plus large que n’importe quel accord commercial antérieur, incluant notamment, le contrôle des subventions à la pêche, un système de gestion des pêches, la prévention du trafic illégal d’espèces sauvages, la conservation de la diversité biologique et la transition vers une économie à faibles émissions. Pour le Vietnam, la participation à un accord de portée comme le PTPGP présente à la fois des avantages et des défis. Des grands efforts seront nécessaires pour ce pays afin de respecter ses engagements et de se conformer aux exigences élevées en matière de protection de l’environnement. Par contre, cela aidera le Vietnam, étant bien préparé, à mieux s’intégrer au processus de mondialisation économique. Cette étude vise à analyser les obligations environnementales dans le PTPGP avec un regard parallèle sur l’état actuel du droit vietnamien, et, partant, leurs impacts sur les politiques du Vietnam en matière de l’environnement.

One of the characteristics of recent free trade agreements in the Asia-Pacific region is based on the incorporation of rules governing extra-commercial issues (known as WTO-X rules), including those on labor in a chapter dedicated to this subject or in a chapter on sustainable development. Apart from substantial commitments or obligations relating to work, these agreements include mechanisms to resolve disputes arising from the implementation of this or that substantial obligation. Some agreements also establish very strict disciplinary measures in the form of a financial fine or commercial sanction. The most ambitious in this regard, the United States-Mexico-Canada Agreement (USMCA) contains significant changes to further strengthen the disciplinary regime established by previous trade agreements concluded by the United States. These changes could then be included in future U.S. free trade agreements with Asia-Pacific countries. However, a question that arises is whether these mechanisms are effective? The practice of dispute resolution (especially those in which the United States and the European Union have participated as complaining party) indicates that despite the rigorous nature of enforcement measures, a more flexible approach, it seems, is favored in order to effectively resolve disputes and enforce substantive obligations in this area.

In a globalized economy where value chains account for around 70% of total trade in goods (OECD 2021) while Asia, and in particular China, has become the workshop of the world. The relations of many states and China constitute an example of a situation of complex interdependence (Keohane and Nye 2011). That is to say, beyond the political and strategic tensions that States have with China, they find themselves intertwined, particularly through foreign direct investment, trade flows and value chains, in an intense commercial relationship which ensures a significant part of their prosperity. Additionally, the COVID-19 pandemic has disrupted global value chains and international supply. ational. It is in this context that anti-Chinese discourse and calls for disengagement, particularly in the United States, are gaining momentum. The conference will be an opportunity to validate whether the disengagement advocated is verified in reality. What is at the heart of the questioning is internal stability national and regional, the government ance of the global economy and economic well-being. If, as is believed, the hypothesis of disengagement from China is confirmed, we will question its causes and its implementation methods. Three sub-questions are of particular concern to us: Is the United States going it alone or are we seeing a widespread movement in favor of a policy of disengagement? Are China-based firms following suit and leaving? Generalized or sectoral? And, are we witnessing a repatriation of the production of firms established in China to their country of origin or a relocation of their activities elsewhere, particularly in Southeast Asia? The general hypothesis states that relations with China are conditioned both by the rank occupied by each state in the power structure (military, economic and geopolitical) and by the intensity of economic dependence on China. During the conference, emphasis will be placed in particular on the case of Canada.

It is an undeniable fact that a good corporate gove ance constitutes the key to the long term success of any corporation. We have noticed that so far most corporations operating in Vietnam do not pay enough attention to corporate gove ance issues. They are more inclined to show a formal observance of the provisions of law than to actually adhere to corporate gove ance principles. Having said that, the rules regulating corporate gove ance are quite detailed and cover the various aspects of corporate gove ance. Furthermore, it is easy to notice the influence of Anglo-Saxon and European approaches on these rules notably when it comes to public companies. This may be attributable first to the growing shareholding of investors coming from those countries in the capital of local corporations and secondly to the Vietnamese lawmaker’s will to align his texts with well-known inte ational practices. In this paper, we will first examine the concept and models of corporate gove ance for local companies and companies with foreign capital recognised by Vietnamese law. Then, we will address the legal framework of corporate gove ance applicable to domestic shareholding companies and those with foreign capital, given that shareholding companies remain the form of company the most used in Vietnam for the time being and their gove ance is still the most complex compared to other forms of company. Those analyses are accompanied by a demonstration of local pratices and a tracking of inte ational influences.

The “Sustainable Development Chapters (TSD Chapters)” have been a feature in the EU’s new generation FTA, as a policy tool to promote sustainable trade and investment which respects social and environment standards. The EU has nonetheless been criticised for opting for a soft enforcement mechanism entailing doubt about its seriousness to ensure compliance with sustainable commitments. This article examines the recent proposal of the Commission in the Communication entitled “The power of trade partnerships: together for green and just economic growth” to move towards strengthening the enforcement of TSD chapters of the EU's trade agreements and assesses its implications for EU’s partners. Keywords: Trade and Sustainable Development (TSD), labour standards, enforcement

La présence de la Chine en Afrique est multiforme. Sur le plan institutionnel, si la Chine souhaite remodeler les institutions multilatérales et en créer de nouvelles, elle doit s’appuyer sur sa capacité à obtenir le soutien du Sud à ses initiatives mondiales. L’Afrique est, en effet, le bloc le plus important à l’Assemblée générale des Nations unies ( ONU ) avec 28% des voix, contre 27% pour l’Asie, 17% pour les Amériques et 15% pour l’Europe occidentale. Et les pays africains sont, actuellement, les supports de la Chine pour isoler Tapei : à l’heure actuelle,, un seul Etat africain, - l’Eswatini- reconnait Taïwan. Sur le plan économique, la Chine représentait 3% des investissements étrangers en  Afrique il y a 20 ans et a dépassé 20% en 2021, constate P. Dupoux, Directeur associé senior à BCG. Il souligne, également, l’originalité de la logique d’investissement : «  les critères d’investissement  européens ou américains reposent beaucoup sur le risque- pays alors que pour les chinois, c’est presque l’inverse. Plus un pays est risqué, moins les acteurs seront nombreux et plus leurs opérations auront des chances d’aboutir. » Toutefois, même si  selon le président chinois, la Chine demeure le partenaire le plus  »fiable » de l’Afrique, son partenariat pose, cependant, certaines questions avec les problématiques de la corruption, de la protection des droits de l’homme et de la bonne gouve ance. Enfin, sur le plan militaire, la Chine a adopté, en 2015, une loi autorisant le déploiement à l’étranger de l’Armée populaire de libération ( APL ) et des autres forces de sécurité chinoises. Deux ans plus tard, Pékin a établi sa première base navale à Djibouti et le projet d’ajouter une nouvelle base navale en Afrique soulève, actuellement, des questions sur la stratégie de plus en plus militarisée de la Chine et peut alimenter les craintes d’une atteinte à la souveraineté. Face à cette réalité, il importera,  en particulier, d’analyser les comportements de grandes puissances comme l’Union européenne et la Russie.

In the current inte ational environment, we are witnessing unprecedented economic pressure, massive application of illegal unilateral restrictive measures (the so called "sanctions"), disruption of traditional trade ties and supply chains. We live in an era when the old formats and instruments of economic cooperation that have developed over many decades are becoming increasingly inadequate to the challenges that we face. With this background, it becomes clear that one of the key challenges today is building a new architecture of foreign trade relations through the creation of new systems and new formats of inte ational partnerships in various areas of trade and economic cooperation. Many examples from the world practice indicate that there is no sense to create one or even several typical models of inte ational trade cooperation since each of them will contain a significant proportion of idle or potentially harmful elements. Due to their structural limitations, rigid integration organizations such as free trade areas, customs and economic unions fail to envisage highly flexible forms of interaction involving individual states, their regional groups, individual industries and companies. In addition, such phenomena as unification, harmonization and the creation of mandatory standards and rules are becoming less relevant. In the current political and economic conditions, trade cooperation requires in each specific case the use of unique tools and solutions that meet the goals and objectives to be achieved. It also follows from this that trade cooperation projects should proceed from the ground-up and not top-down. Otherwise, specific problems either are not identified or buried in large-scale ideas. More than that, cooperation cannot be limited to increasing trade and investment only. Social aspects of trade and economic relations come to the fore. Among them are first of all, ensuring food and energy security, fair conditions for inte ational technology transfer, availability of essential products for all people. Traditional commercial instruments of trade regulation are not able to solve these problems. We are facing fundamentally new challenges that require fundamentally new solutions and corresponding tools. With all these in mind, the Russian initiative to form the “Greater Eurasian Partnership” takes on a special significance.

In 2018, the CPTTP was enacted in the Pacific Rim as more than a typical economic partnership agreement aimed at eliminating tariffs but encompassing a number of important elements, including environmental protection. The CPTTP seems to bring great hope for environmental protection in the region, as there has been no established inte ational organization to handle environmental protection in the region. However, conce s have been expressed as early as this year. For example, environmental NGOs in the United Kingdom, which is expected to formally join the CPTTP by the end of this year, 2023, have expressed the following conce s; (i) Defending investors who challenge climate and environmental policies through the Investor-State Dispute Settlement Mechanism (ISDS), which could ultimately limit the UK’s ability to achieve its environmental goals; (ii) The CPTTP includes a chapter on “technical barriers to trade,” which may prevent gove ments from introducing new environmentally friendly regulations, labels and standards; (iii) The rules that the CPTTP establishes for gove ment procurement are limited and will not allow for policies that support the development of local industries or methods to mandate “green purchasing” in gove ment contracts, which are often used to build local capacity to generate renewable energy; (iv) The UK could also be required to eliminate or reduce tariffs on palm oil, which could lead to increased production and imports of such products, resulting in greater deforestation in palm oil exporting countries such as Malaysia; (v) The provisions of the CPTPP more closely mirror the U.S. approach to precautionary measures, making it more difficult to regulate to reduce potential harm, resulting in lower standards of environmental protection. (vi) Joining the CPTPP could increase pressure to weaken food and animal welfare standards in the United Kingdom, which are currently among the highest in the world (allowing for the use of growth hormones and far more use of pesticides in food production). 　However, historically, for example, ISDS is known to have contributed to environmental protection. Regarding the adoption of the U.S. approach to the precautionary principle, some believe that the U.S. approach may rather be regarded as a pragmatic approach. In this paper, the author attempts to analyze to what extent these conce s are realistic, and if so, what improvements are needed, through comparisons with inte ational instruments on the environment and trade.

The EVIPA investment disputes settlement mechanism attracts a lot of attention during these last few years in Vietnam. This presentation aims to examine this mechanism, while addressing two issues. Firstly, we will analyze new points of EVIPA’s investment dispute settlement mechanism, such as: permanent dispute settlement organ, measures to enhance arbitral decisions’ enforcement, third party’s funding, rules to limit frivolous claims… Secondly, challenges for Vietnam linked to the use of this mechanism will be studied. Among them, we will highlight different difficulties, such as those related to the preparation for the participation to dispute settlement, the lack of human resource. Some suggestions will therefore be proposed in order for Vietnam to be able to participate more effectively to the EVIPA investment dispute settlement mechanism.

The Greater Mekong Subregion (GMS) Program, established in 1992, promotes regional economic integration through the improvement of physical connectivity and facilitation of trade and investment. Covering 2.6 million square kilometers and a combined population of around 326 million including developing countries:  Cambodia, the People's Republic of China (PRC, specifically Yunnan Province and Guangxi Zhuang Autonomous Region), Lao People's Democratic Republic (Lao PDR), Myanmar, Thailand, and Viet Nam. Many programs and reforms in both inte ational and national levels have been done to archive the goals. However, the trading partners in regional economic cooperation in the GMS did not facilitate the trade as expected, as evidenced by perennial trade deficits. Awa ess of the GMS’ trade potential and the GMS Program’s economic integration aspirations remains a challenge as trade facilitation reforms lag behind improved physical connectivity. Calculating for a period of 30 years of GMS programs, this article aims to make recommendations to build a legal framework for investment cooperation in the region.

The rise of the “data economy” in the 21st century has remarkably transformed the business landscape, especially the ASEAN economy and led to a vast amount of collection and processing of personal data by technology companies. The emergence of security, privacy, and human rights conce s has necessitated the development of regulatory solutions, especially under the light of inte ational investment law. Host states are obligated to facilitate the free flow of digital trade and investment, which can create tensions with domestic laws aimed at protecting citizens' rights and national security. When offshore companies challenge more stringent regulatory changes regarding personal data protection or data localization requirements, legal issues may arise. A key question in this regard is whether the data collected by such companies should be deemed an investment and therefore, protected under inte ational investment treaties. Additionally, while data processing and analysis may yield significant benefits for organizations, it is important to recognize that the data subject retains ownership of their data. As such, there may be conce s that treating collected personal data as the private property of businesses could undermine the data subject's right to informational privacy. This conflict further necessitates a resolution for the harmonization of interest between the host state and foreign investors to ensure the development of a sustainable business environment. Given Vietnam's significant number of signed and implemented treaties and the increasing expansion of data-driven businesses in Viet Nam, this paper aims to examine the tension between Viet Nam’s data protection laws and inte ational investment agreements (IIAs). By shedding light on these complex issues using approaches to the definition of investment in IIAs as a covered investment and data privacy doctrines, this paper aims to contribute to a better understanding of the interplay between data protection and inte ational investment law. Through this research, the authors aspire to clarify the boundaries between privacy protection and economic facilitation in Vietnam, with the ultimate goal of promoting the country as an attractive destination for foreign investment. Keywords: inte ational investment agreements, privacy rights, data protection, host state, cyber security, data localization.

The issue of whether investment treaties can cause a "regulatory chill," which is the reluctance to regulate environmental and social issues due to the fear of investment claims, has been a long-standing conce . Recent research has identified two possible outcomes of this problem. On one hand, these treaties can improve national gove ance and promote the rule of law for all. On the other hand, they can give excessive power to foreign investors and result in regulatory chill. Therefore, investment treaties are expected to both empower and constrain. Despite the critical role of national gove ance in implementing inte ational investment treaties, it has received little research attention to date. This article aims to investigate the relationship between inte ational investment agreements and national gove ance, with a focus on Vietnam's renewable energy sector. Specifically, the study will examine the policies developed and implemented to encourage investment in this sector and determine whether a regulatory chill effect exists. Additionally, the article will consider the implications of the separation of powers between the Ministry of Industry and Trade, which oversees commercial activities with foreign elements, and EVN, which negotiates electricity prices, signs Feed-in Tariff (FiT) contracts, and collaborates directly with foreign investors.

The World Trade Organization (WTO) is currently realigning its strategic objectives to place greater emphasis on the utilization of trade as a means to attain wider objectives of economic advancement and sustainability. The Fisheries Subsidies Agreement, which has recently been concluded, exemplify the World Trade Organization's shift towards a novel trade and sustainability discourse. Further exploration is required to determine the degree to which sustainability may be in competition with or subordinate to other policy objectives, such as national security, fair competition, efficiency, or diversification conce s. Following the recent acceptance by the United States, the agreement is poised to become legally enforceable among its member states. As a member of WTO, Vietnam has entered into regional free trade agreements (FTAs) that incorporate clauses pertaining to the favorable treatment of Vietnamese seafood products upon importation by member nations within the same region. These agreements include the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP), the European Union-Vietnam Free Trade Agreement (EVFTA), and the ASEAN Trade in Goods Agreement (ATIGA). The simultaneous implementation of all these commitments is decisive in achieving the sustainable development of fisheries that Vietnam has been pursuing. As a result, our research will examine first Vietnam's current legislation on fisheries subsidies, then the legal framework's compatibility with existing inte ational treaties, and finally the assumptive implementation of the WTO Fisheries Subsidy Agreement.

The Mekong is the world’s tenth and the longest transboundary river in Southeast Asia. Its watershed originates in the Tibetan plateau and spans over China, Myanmar, Thailand, Laos, Cambodia, and Vietnam. The Mekong provides direct livelihoods and source of revenue for more than 80 million people. Mekong River is particularly important in biodiversity conservation, aquaculture, water transportation and especially development of renewable energy – hydropower. In the 1960s, hydropower development was expected to develop economy and reduce extreme poverty in the region. There is no denying the great value of hydropower projects, especially mega-dam stations, but problems of balancing economic benefits and environmental protection under the negative impacts of climate change have become a significant challenge for coastal countries. Existing agreements, including the 1995 Mekong River Agreement and the 1997 Convention on the Law of Non-Navigational Uses of Inte ational Watercourses, do not specifically provide obligations to carry out transnational environmental impact assessments, country – investors’ responsibility to protect the environment as well as legitimate rights and interests of minority groups. Within the scope of this article, the author focuses on researching the inte ational legal aspect, status implementation of inte ational conventions, hence making some recommendations related to sustainable development in the Greater Mekong sub-region.

Besides being members of the World Trade Organization (WTO), Asia-Pacific countries participate to regional trade agreements (RTAs), as well as inte ational investment agreements (IIAs). Vietnam is also the case. This “diversification” of inte ational economic cooperation can be explained by many advantages. However, some issues may be raised, in particular those related to the complexities linked to the implementation of many multilateral and regional rules. To manage this situation is even more complicated for developing countries, including Vietnam. We will firstly evaluate the legal problems related to Vietnam’s participation to diverse RTAs and IIAs in addition to the WTO. Secondly, we will propose some solutions to these problems. All these analyzes will be made in comparison with the situation in some other Asia-Pacific countries which have similar problems as Vietnam’s.

It is proposed to look at China-EU relations in the light of environmental protection. This perspective highlights the paradoxes of this relationship, which is characterized by "systemic rivalry" on the one hand and inextricable interdependence on the other.  The European Union is particularly dependent on Chinese raw materials such as lithium or cobalt. While it aspires to become the first carbon-neutral continent by 2050, this dependence is likely to increase with its conversion to electric vehicles. The Commission has therefore proposed a regulation on critical raw materials to guarantee the security of European supply. Similar difficulties also exist for renewable energy technologies.  The European Union is nevertheless determined to introduce greater reciprocity in its relations with China, by protecting itself against imports of products that do not respect certain social and environmental standards. For example, the Commission has presented a regulation for a "net zero" industry, to increase the production of green technologies in Europe. In addition, the global agreement on investments, which has been suspended since March 2021, includes provisions on sustainable development. In particular, it aims at the effective implementation of the Paris Agreement and the respect of ILO conventions.  In addition, the European Union has launched a response to China's "Belt and Road" strategy, entitled "Global Gateway".  It should enable the development of infrastructures geared towards sustainable development throughout the world, while guaranteeing the Union's strategic autonomy.  Environmental issues thus appear to fully illustrate the strategic path that the European Union intends to take in building its relations with China: the quest for autonomy and cooperation. It is therefore proposed to look at this strategy from a legal perspective.

The pivot of Western economic relations towards the Asia-Pacific is not a recent phenomenon since Japan and more recently China have played a large role in this progressive evolution. What would usher in a new era would rather be a shift from Asian countries towards Africa, certainly with a magnitude for China considerably greater than for Japan, or even for India. The results obtained by China obviously affected the influence that Western powers could still exercise over their former colonies in Africa. The parameters to take into account to judge the influence of a country can change depending on the point of view one takes (continental or sub-Saharan Africa, French-speaking, English-speaking, Portuguese-speaking Africa, etc.), depending on the period considered, not to mention the availability of data. We clearly distinguish accessibility from the availability of statistical data. For reasons of financial secrecy demanded by both creditors and debtors, certain available data are not made accessible by the World Bank. The disclosure of certain data in 2019 was intended to put pressure on China. Then, taking advantage of the Covid crisis, the publication of data relating to the debt of countries eligible for the debt service suspension initiative in turn aimed to put pressure on debtors and creditors alike to negotiate restructurings. All these elements explain the difficulties in accounting for the evolution of an economic-financial influence which, moreover, is only a subject of intellectual interest for a very limited number of people. Where we can think that French influence is most significant is that which can still be exercised in its former colonies – in other words a more restricted space than French-speaking Africa – mainly in those of sub-Saharan Africa. World Bank data tracking sub-Saharan African country debt from 2012 to 2021 has been made available in relatively disaggregated form in an online database at https://databank.worldbank.org/source/world - development - indicators. The year 2012 marks a milestone ant since it is the year in which China joins France in the importance of its African claims. In the contribution that we are submitting, the period 2012-2021 will therefore be retained to assess the recent evolution of French influence in its seventeen former sub-Saharan colonies (Benin, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Comoros, Congo, Ivory Coast, Djibouti, Gabon, Guinea, Madagascar, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Senegal, Chad and Togo).   In our contribution we propose to establish a state of the debt of these countries in order to draw an assessment of the evolution of Chinese influence to the detriment of French. We follow the methodological tradition of classical institutionalism which is based on an exploitation of the facts: “just the facts”, as Paul Krugman said quoting Sergeant Friday, or even “looking for reality in the facts” as advised Deng Xiaoping, taking up a traditional catachresis. We will therefore make the “choice of description” in the sense of Amartya Sen and, as much as possible, of axiological neutrality.

Under the 1987 Brundtland Commission Report, the concept of sustainable development was described as “development that meets the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs”. As observable, although economic development is essential, it should be in line with other aspects, including environmental protection. This harmonization becomes more and more important and requires adequate attention in today’s world, where trade activities are proliferating and creating adverse impacts on the environment. Following this, the phenomenon of trade pivot to Asia-Pacific region is no exception. Beside establishing many free trade agreements (FTAs) in the region to facilitate trade, foster collaboration between economies, etc., such as the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP), the European Union-Vietnam Free Trade Agreement (EVFTA) and the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP), countries must keep promoting the implementation of environmental protection provisions. Specifically, several ASEAN countries are vulnerable to climate change so it is significant for them to develop their economies and tackle climate change simultaneously. In this context, this study analyzes climate change response commitments under certain FTAs (also mentioning the absence of such commitments under the RCEP), namely the CPTPP and the EVFTA, as well as examines the law and practices of some ASEAN countries (in connection with common ASEAN policy), namely Vietnam and Singapore, in implementing these commitments. The study aims to ultimately answer the question of whether there are opportunities for ASEAN countries to promote climate change adaptation under free trade agreements.   Keywords: Asia-Pacific, ASEAN, RCEP, CPTPP, EVFTA, trade and sustainable development, climate change adaptation

In the context of strongly promoting the deep integration of the global supply value chain, facilitating regional economic recovery, and creating new impetus for regional trade and investment growth, on 15 November 2020, ASEAN members and ASEAN’s five major regional trading partners (including China, Japan, South Korea, Australia, and New Zealand) signed the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership ( RCEP ) and this agreement officially entered into force on January 1, 2022. The RCEP is said to go beyond the concept of “regional economic integration” when it is an agreement that not only comes from a central role of ASEAN but also is underpinned by free trade agreements ( FTAs ) between ASEAN and each of its major partners, which made up of diverse economies with different levels of economic development in the Asian region. The RCEP has created an extensive free trade market with many regulations on trade in goods and services, investment, intellectual property, e-commerce, and competition policy, with the stated goal of creating a “mode , comprehensive, high-quality, and mutually beneficial”. This reflects the increasing development of investment law in the context of countries developing policies, legislation, and strengthening regional trade strategies. Thus, the RCEP has enacted the basic principles of investment protection and, at the same time, improved some of the rules for covered investments under existing FTAs. However, the “attractiveness” of RCEP also faces many challenges and doubts, among which is the lack of provisions on Investor-State Dispute Settlement ( ISDS ) - terms inherent in FTAs between ASEAN and each partner. Instead, it includes a built-in workflow for Parties to discuss ISDS in the future while its current regulation seems to only allow investors to protect themselves through a dispute settlement mechanism between member states. The RCEP’s omission of the ISDS provision reflects a different approach that may face challenges with respect to cross-country settlement procedures and investor protection under overlapping investment treaties. This article will analyze and evaluate the challenges posed by the RCEP regulations to the ISDS. Is it possible for RCEP to build a new ISDS model, at least has different points from previous ISDS models? And does it prevent the purpose of promoting and attracting investment in the region and with each country, including Vietnam? In addition, the authors present other ISDS models in different institutions for comparison and reference.

Russia's interest in the Asia-Pacific region (APR) has long-standing historical roots. Since the XVII century, the annexation of Siberia and the Far Easte territories, the easte vector of foreign policy has been stable and is an important factor in the economic development of the country. In the last decade, we have seen an increase in Russia's attention to the region, which is a consequence of the increase in the economic and political importance of the APR in the world. The Easte vector of Russia's mode policy is aimed at solving three main tasks: accelerating the development of the Russian Far East, integrating the Russian economy into the APR, and strengthening bilateral and multilateral cooperation with the countries of the region. The concept of the foreign policy of the Russian Federation (approved on March 31, 2023) sets one of the most important tasks the formation of a Large Eurasian Partnership that unites the potential of all states, regional organizations (EAEU, SCO, ASEAN, etc.), the coupling of the development plans of the EAEU and the Chinese "The Belt and Road initiative" while maintaining the possibility of participation in this partnership all interested states and multilateral associations of the Eurasian continent. In the context of confrontation with the collective West after the coup d'etat in 2014 in Ukraine, the "Tu to the East" has become an important factor in hedging foreign policy risks. In addition, the activation of the easte vector of Russian foreign policy, economic and humanitarian cooperation, the so-called "Tu to the East" is the practical implementation of the Russian concept of a multipolar world, within which it sees itself as one of the global poles of power. The uniqueness of the situation in the Eurasian space is determined by the fact that the emergence of an undisputed hegemon is unlikely here. A region that includes three great powers (Russia, India, China) and a large group of smaller but significant states (Iran, Pakistan, Indonesia, Vietnam, etc.) can not only be a region of tough competition, but also, on the contrary, contribute to the emergence of a unique inte ational cooperation regime. Keywords: Russia, China, tu to East, Asia-Pacific region, Greater Eurasia, regional integration.

India has always been active in the multilateral trading system. It is a founding member of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade [1]  and the Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization (WTO). It has always tried to make its voice heard (in favor of developing countries) within this system, whether during the negotiations for the establishment of the GATT and the WTO or after the establishment of these two iers. After the liberalization of its economy in 1991, its accession to the WTO in 1995 and the increase in internal trade Subsequently, it had to drop tariff barriers for non-tariff barriers such as trade remedies. Therefore, it became the first user of anti-dumping measures but only after it was a target of these measures for a long time. Its long presence in the multilateral trading system has resulted in rich and abundant litigation covering several WTO agreements, several legal issues and several industries, thus demonstrating the issues at stake in international trade. ational not only for India but also for its trading partners. In addition, many disputes involving India concern ent the interpretation (of a provision) of a WTO agreement for the first time as well as interpretations and key situations. At first, it clashed with powers such as the United States and the European Union, but the expansion of its international trade relations international organizations has also led to an increase in the number of members it faces. This article aims to examine this Indian dispute at GATT and the WTO in order to -to understand the systemic and commercial interests that India defends through this litigation, -decipher India's legal and economic strategies within the multilateral trading system, -to understand the evolution of this dispute according to the evolution of India's situation in the multilateral trading system, -determine changes in the behavior of India and its trading partners over time and -analyze the reasoning of the judicial authorities in these disputes to find out whether the objectives of India and its trading partners have been achieved.   [1] General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) in English.

The article explores the maintenance of the equilibrium situation between the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework (IPEF) and the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RECEP) within the Greater Mekong Subregion (GMS) by focusing on cases study on Cambodia, Lao, Myanmar, and Thailand. In the past decades, China, with its Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), assumed the leading position in supporting the RCEP to pave the way for inte ational development and global economic balance. Also, in the recent year, to hedge the decreasing role of the US in Southeast Asia, the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework (IPEF) was initiated to strengthen its position along with East Asian and Weste economic alliances. The two sides of the world economic cooperation and competition, China led RCEP and the U.S. led IPEF impact the Greater Mekong subregion in having to balance the economic cooperation and competition between the two economic powers. This paper thus explores how GMS countries’ positions under the two inte ational economic cooperation and competition are. The article also suggests possible inte ational agreements and policies that can rebalance the two sides of global partnership for development in GMS. Keywords: Indo-Pacific Economic Framework (IPEF), Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP), Greater Mekong subregion, Cooperation and Competition

The Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) is the world’s largest regional trading bloc, consisting of a combined population of 2.2 billion people (30% of the world) and nearly 28% of global trade. It comprises the 10 members of ASEAN (Brunei Darussalam, Cambodia, Indonesia, Lao PDR, Malaysia, Myanmar, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, and Viet Nam) and five other countries in the region – Australia, China, Japan, the Republic of Korea, and New Zealand. RCEP is expected to benefit not only East Asia but will also have a global impact because it will enhance open regionalism and global trade in terms of a rules-based trading framework. The RCEP is an important framework for global trade and regionalism, given the current context of uncertainty and inward-looking policies in response to the COVID-19 pandemic and the US-China trade war. At the same time, the implementation of the RCEP will strengthen the position of Asian geopolitics. This paper will provide information on this regional agreement and analyze its impacts on the economy and politics of Asia – an emerging hub for inte ational trade with the most promising markets.

Mekong countries face a difficult trade-off between energy needs and food production as the global energy and food crises worsen. Thus far, this issue has largely been mediated within the decision-making bodies of individual countries. This absence of inter-country coordination can result in ruinous ecological changes that impact the entire Mekong sub-region. Countries located higher in the stream of the Mekong River build hydroelectric dams to power their manufacturing industries. These dams cause serious negative exte alities, which include reductions in agricultural production among the Lower Mekong River countries due to compromised river ecosystems and salinization. Given the current context, it is necessary to have a joint coordination mechanism among countries in the Mekong sub-region. Countries need to know the regional consequences of their individual actions in order to mitigate (or eliminate) the negative effects on the entire ecosystem. However, countries are often self-interested. Therefore, it is necessary to have an incentive or sanction mechanism that encourages maximal contribution to the shared sub-regional interests. The phenomenon of tu ing the commercial shaft to Asia Pacific comes with agreements signed by several countries will cause the motives of Mekong countries to change. In addition, the new trade context will affect the production and supply chain of the two food and energy industries making Mekong countries have different choices and behaviors compared to before. The paper analyzes changes in the choices and policies of Mekong countries in the context of trade integration that affect the energy and food value chains as well as related clusters. From there, the author makes recommendations on possible alliances between the countries of the Mekong sub-region to protect the environment and maximize the benefits of countries in the energy and food industries. Keywords: Mekong countries, trade integration, digitalization, value chain, energy and food, free trade agreements, economic growth, Asia-Pacific region, cluster framework .